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Supply Chain Resilience in a Developing Country Context:  
 
A Case Study on the Interconnectedness of Threats, Strategies, and Outcomes 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: In the few prior empirical studies on Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES), the focus has been 
on the developed world. Yet organisations in developing countries constitute a significant part of 
global supply chains and have also experienced the disastrous effects of supply chain failures. The 
purpose of this paper is therefore to empirically investigate SCRES in a developing country context, 
and to show that this also provides theoretical insights into the nature of what we mean by resilience.  
Design/methodology/approach: Using a case study approach, a supply network of 20 manufacturing 
firms in Uganda is analysed based on a total of 45 interviews.  
Findings: The perceived threats to SCRES in this context are mainly small-scale, chronic disruptive 
events rather than the discrete, large-scale catastrophic events typically emphasised in the literature. 
The data reveals how threats of disruption, resilience strategies, and outcomes are inter-related in 
complex, coupled and non-linear ways. These interrelationships are explained by the political, 
cultural, and territorial embeddedness of the supply network in a developing country. Further, this 
embeddedness contributes to the phenomenon of supply chain risk migration, whereby an attempt to 
mitigate one threat produces another threat and/or shifts the threat to another point in the supply 
network.  
Practical implications: Managers should be aware, for example, of potential risk migration from one 
threat to another when crafting strategies to build SCRES. Equally, the potential for risk migration 
across the supply network means managers should look at the supply chain holistically because actors 
along the chain are so interconnected. 
Originality/value: The paper goes beyond the extant literature by highlighting how SCRES is not 
only about responding to specific, isolated threats but about the continuous management of risk 
migration. It demonstrates that resilience requires both an understanding of the interconnectedness of 
threats, strategies, and outcomes and an understanding of the embeddedness of the supply network. 
Finally, our focus on the context of a developing country reveals that resilience should be equally 
concerned both with smaller in scale, chronic disruptions and with occasional, large-scale catastrophic 
events. 
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Recent research has emphasised the importance of Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) for surviving 
the adverse effects of disruptive events (e.g. Carvalho et al., 2012; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014). 
SCRES is based on the premise that not all risks are avoidable (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Hohenstein 
et al., 2015), but by building resilience, firms can manage the threat of disruption to their supply 
chains and continue delivering goods and services to customers (Ambulkar et al., 2015; Scholten & 
Schilder, 2015). Although we are yet to reach full consensus on a definition of SCRES (Scholten et 
al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015), most scholars agree that it is concerned with a supply chain’s readiness, 
effective response to, and recovery from a disruption – returning to the previous level or, preferably, 
an even better level of operational performance (Hohenstein et al., 2015; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015).  
SCRES is an important topic in the operations and supply chain management literature that is in 
need of more research (Ambulkar et al., 2015; Hohenstein et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015; Scholten & 
Schilder, 2015). To date, few empirical studies on SCRES have been reported in the literature; and 
those that have been published were mainly conducted in Western Europe and North America (e.g. 
Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010; Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 2013; Scholten & Schilder, 2015), leaving 
developing countries severely underrepresented. Yet developing countries, which constitute a 
significant part of global supply chains and the world’s population, have similarly experienced the 
devastating effects of supply chain failures (Chika et al., 2011). Further, there are grounds for 
believing that the most catastrophic effects of supply chain failures (particularly on human life) have 
been experienced in developing economies. Recent research on SCRES has examined the resilience of 
supply chains to product counterfeiters (Stevenson & Busby, 2015), and this can be a particularly 
acute problem in developing countries (Chika et al., 2011). Indeed, it was reported that the infiltration 
of counterfeit drugs into pharmaceutical supply chains led to the death of 2,500 people in 1995 and 
192,000 people in 2001 in Nigeria and China, respectively (Chan et al., 2010). In addition, developing 
countries are more vulnerable to particular supply chain risks such as political turmoil, including rebel 
activities and post-election violence, and to bribery, poor transportation infrastructure, corruption and 
other unethical business practices (Lakovou et al., 2007; Transparency International, 2013). In 2011, 
Uganda suffered a severe crisis in fuel and raw material supply chains that disrupted the production 
and delivery of many goods and services. This sparked massive country-wide protests, and was 
followed by a violent police crackdown and many fatalities (The Independent, 2011). It therefore 
follows that we should be concerned with the resilience of developing world supply chains not only 
because, in a globally-connected world, their failure has repercussions elsewhere (Pereira et al., 2014; 
Kim et al., 2015; Levalle & Nof, 2015), but because the human consequences can be so significant. 
The literature has presented many strategies for improving the resilience of supply chains, such as 
increasing flexibility and creating redundancy. But there is a noticeable lack of research on the 
relationships between the various strategies. Some scholars consider these strategies to be independent 
(Sheffi & Rice, 2005; Zsidisin & Wagner, 2010); but others argue they are interrelated (e.g. Jüttner & 
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Maklan, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013), with their outcomes either complementing or contradicting each 
other. Thus, it becomes important to study resilience systemically. In other words, investigating the 
inter-relationships between threats of disruption (and the conditions that lead to threats), strategies, 
and outcomes rather than analysing them individually and separately. 
Against this backdrop, we adopt a case study approach, conducting interviews across a supply 
network of 20 manufacturing firms in Uganda, to address two research questions: 
1.  What do manufacturing firms in a developing country perceive to be the threats to their supply 
chains; what strategies do they adopt to build resilience; and what are the outcomes of 
implementing these strategies? 
2.  How are such threats of disruption and strategies interrelated; and what does this mean for supply 
chain resilience? 
 
The study finds that threats of disruption, strategies and their outcomes are strongly 
interconnected, with threats commonly being side-effects of strategies, and attempts to build 
resilience commonly producing unexpected, further adaptations within the supply chain that 
themselves require intervention. Thus, to build resilience, it becomes important to appreciate the 
interconnectedness of threats, strategies, and outcomes. We also find that it is important to understand 
the context in which the supply chain is located in order to explain such inter-relationships. Therefore, 
we draw on an embeddedness framework to examine how the political, geographical and cultural 
context contributes to a phenomenon of supply chain risk migration and influences SCRES. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the relevant literature on SCRES 
is reviewed before Section 3 outlines the research method used. Section 4 presents a first level 
analysis of the data according to threats, SCRES strategies, and outcomes. This is followed by Section 
5, which presents a second level analysis that reveals the interconnections between threats, strategies, 
and outcomes; and which adopts an embeddedness perspective to explain how and why such 
interconnectedness comes about. Conclusions are thereafter provided in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) has emerged from the broader concept of resilience studied in a 
number of other disciplines, from ecology to organisational studies (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). 
To date, the literature specifically on SCRES is dominated by modelling and theoretical work on 
strategies for building resilience. Recent modelling work includes Kristianto et al. (2014), on supply 
chain design and redundancy; Levalle & Nof (2015), on network formation and configuration; Rajesh 
& Ravi (2015), on appropriate supplier selection; and Das & Lashkari (2015), on risk readiness and 
planning. Recent theoretical contributions include Day (2014), on a complex adaptive systems 
framework that links SCRES to disaster relief; and Pereira et al. (2014), on the link between 
procurement and SCRES. Meanwhile, Kim et al. (2015) highlighted how different types of supply 
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chain structural relationships affect SCRES, arguing that resilience should be analysed from a 
network perspective. Many of these studies highlighted the need for more empirical work on SCRES.  
Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015) recently conducted a systematic literature review on SCRES based on 
91 articles and found that the number of empirical papers – case studies or surveys – was limited to 
just 19 articles. Further, most of this empirical work was conducted in developed countries, 
particularly in Western Europe and North America (e.g. Gölgeci & Ponomarov, 2013; Wieland & 
Wallenburg, 2013; Scholten & Schilder, 2015). This prior work has also focused on high-profile 
catastrophic, discrete events, e.g. terrorist attacks (Rice & Caniato, 2003), the global financial crisis 
(Jüttner & Maklan, 2011), rail crashes (Johnson et al., 2013), war (Urciuoli et al., 2014), and 
Hurricane Katrina (Scholten et al., 2014). A similar focus on large-scale disasters can also be found in 
conceptual papers on SCRES (e.g. Day, 2014; Saenz & Revilla, 2014). This focus is understandable, 
but large-scale disasters are rare and common definitions of SCRES do not connect it solely to such 
disasters. Most supply chains are much more likely to be dealing with chronic, repeated threats of 
disruption, and it is such threats that are arguably more likely to be undermining their capabilities. 
Much of the empirical work on SCRES has focused on investigating factors that could facilitate 
the building of SCRES, referred to variously as antecedents, enablers, practices, capabilities, and 
competencies. Hohenstein et al. (2015) recently argued that all of these can, in some way, be 
considered SCRES strategies and include broad ideas such as improving flexibility, creating 
redundancy, building collaborative supply chain relationships, improving supply chain agility, and 
enhancing visibility. More specific practices highlighted in the literature, such as information sharing 
(Brandon-Jones et al., 2014) and reconfiguring resources (Ambulkar et al., 2015), can be considered 
components of collaboration and flexibility, respectively.  
In the following table (Table I), the various SCRES strategies that have so far been proposed in the 
literature are summarised according to whether they are employed proactively or reactively, i.e. 
whether they are used ahead of a potential threat to avoid the disruption or limit its impact, or whether 
they are used after a disruption has occurred to respond or aid recovery. This approach has been 
adopted by many other authors, including Hohenstein et al. (2015) and Dabhilkar et al. (2016), while 
others refer to the use of proactive, reactive and concurrent strategies (Hollnagel, 2011; Ali et al., 
2017). Concurrent strategies are quick, first responses during or in the immediate aftermath of a 
disruption and reactive strategies are focused on post-disruption recovery. This is similar to the 
readiness, response, and recovery phases referred to by other authors (e.g. Ponamarov & Holcomb, 
2009). The simpler reactive/proactive classification however is sufficient for the purposes of our 
paper. Other alternative classifications of strategies that do not focus on when a strategy is deployed 
could include examining whether they support the robustness and/or agility of the supply chain to a 
threat (Wieland & Wallenburg, 2013) or examining the actors involved, e.g. whether a strategy is 
deployed by a single firm or collaboratively, such as with other members of the supply chain (e.g. 
Scholten & Schilder, 2015). 
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Some particular strategies can be either proactive or reactive depending on when and why they are 
applied. Collaboration, for example, can help to mitigate before disruptions occur, e.g. by enabling 
information sharing and the deployment of other strategies, including supplier development. But 
collaboration can also support post-disruption recovery by enabling supply chain actors to share 
resources and provide a coordinated response (Nishiguchi & Beaudet 1998; Scholten et al., 2014). 
Meanwhile, some strategies may be planned and crafted before a disruption but only applied after the 
disruption. For example, redundant suppliers may be selected before the risk event but only contracted 
afterwards.  
The relationships between the strategies in Table I are clearly complex and remain ambiguous 
(Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013; Hohenstein et al., 2015). For example, while scholars 
such as Soni et al. (2014) considered information sharing, visibility, and collaboration as separate 
strategies for building SCRES, others (e.g. Gunasekaran et al., 2015; Kamalahmadi & Parast, 2016) 
have considered information sharing to be a component of collaboration. It is also argued that forming 
collaborative supply chain relationships and creating redundancy can improve flexibility (Jüttner & 
Maklan, 2011; Scholten & Schilder, 2015); and that both flexibility and collaboration can improve 
agility, allowing companies to react faster and select a suitable option for mitigating the effects of 
disruptive events (Carvalho et al., 2012; Gunasekaran et al., 2015). In addition, strategies like 
building social capital and relational competences can be regarded as facilitators of collaboration 
(Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). This clearly points to a need to investigate the relationships among these 
constructs more systematically. 
 
                                                               [Take in Table I] 
 
Flexibility also facilitates other independent SCRES strategies from Table I, such as supply chain 
redesign and the creation of a risk management culture (Kamalahmadi & Parast, 2016). It has been 
further argued that a risk management culture is important in building SCRES through, e.g. helping to 
institutionalise innovation, which requires an organisation-wide set of shared beliefs and 
understanding about innovation. Moreover, a culture of innovation and having innovative individuals 
can facilitate an effective and immediate response to a supply chain disruption (Kamalahmadi & 
Parast, 2016). Another SCRES strategy – visibility – which involves incorporating true sensors at 
different parts of the supply chain and monitoring them regularly is sometimes considered a key 
component of agility (Wieland & Wallenburg, 2013; Kamalahmadi & Parast, 2016). According to 
Kamalahmadi & Parast (2016), making timely and informed decisions on the status of a disrupted 
supply chain and the courses of action to be taken is only possible when there is complete visibility, 
i.e. when decision-makers have complete knowledge of the status of their supply chains. Although 
complete visibility seems unlikely to achieve in practice, the greater the level of visibility and the 
more readily information is made available, the more able a firm will be to prepare for or respond to a 
disruption. For example, Saenz & Revilla (2014) explained that supply chain visibility helped Cisco 
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to improve its agility and resilience to the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011, whereby Cisco 
was able to map out its supply base beyond tier one suppliers and to field 118 customer enquiries. 
Visibility is also related to another strategy, i.e. that of using information and communication 
technology. For example, it is argued that such technology plays a major role in the continuous 
monitoring of supply chains by increasing visibility (Gunasekaran et al., 2015).   
Furthermore, the SCRES strategy of appropriate supplier selection from Table I is related to the 
SCRES strategy of supply chain re-design. More specifically, appropriate supplier selection helps to 
appropriately re-design the supply chain by incorporating competent suppliers in order to mitigate 
supply-side disruptions (e.g. Gunasekaran et al., 2015). Moreover, redundancy, which involves the 
duplication of capacity in order to continue operations during a failure, has been linked to flexibility 
(e.g. Jüttner & Maklan 2011; Kristianto et al., 2014). Redundancy avails resources needed to facilitate 
supply chain flexibility, which facilitates response through the adaptable deployment of resources, 
avoiding delays and thereby increasing SCRES (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). Flexibility can also be 
achieved through another strategy, that of appropriate contracting, e.g. by creating flexible contractual 
arrangements (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). 
Although the above strategies appear to potentially complement each other, they can also conflict. 
For example, building particularly close collaborative relationships can conflict with some aspects of 
flexibility (Stevenson & Spring, 2007; Scholten & Schilder, 2015) while creating redundancy to 
facilitate flexibility may result in liquidity risk (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). Also, collaboration may 
cause additional threats, e.g. through sharing sensitive information (e.g. Jüttner and Maklan, 2011); 
and horizontal collaboration between suppliers may increase supply chain risk through collusion 
(Choi & Krause, 2006). Finally, flexibility through multiple sourcing and the opening of many 
branches by firms may also culminate in liquidity risk (e.g. Jüttner and Maklan, 2011).  
In summary, two important gaps can be identified in the literature: 
1. There is a need for further empirical work on SCRES, particularly across a network of firms and in 
a developing country context. Developing countries are an important player in global supply 
chains and face supply chain disruptions, yet they are underrepresented in the literature. As will be 
briefly highlighted in Section 3.2, developing countries have specific practices and conditions that 
may either produce threats of disruption or hinder the implementation of certain resilience 
strategies. 
2. There is a need to understand the relationships between the various strategies proposed for 
building resilience. It is not just that such strategies may reinforce or contradict each other, but that 
some seem to subsume others, and all have various kinds of unintended consequences once 







3.1 Research Design 
This paper responds to the need for more empirical research into SCRES, and the need to expand 
current understanding of SCRES to include developing country contexts. The nascent state of the 
literature on SCRES in general, and particularly in developing countries, calls for a qualitative, 
exploratory study (Saunders et al., 2009). We are interested in what manufacturing firms perceive to 
be the threats to their supply chains; the strategies they adopt to build resilience; the outcomes of 
implementing these strategies; and, importantly, how threats of disruption, resilience strategies, and 
outcomes are interrelated. These are favourable conditions for adopting the case study approach 
(Stuart et al., 2002) as it enables a thorough examination of complex, real-life phenomena leading to 
new, in-depth insights (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2009). Exploring the interrelatedness of threats, 
strategies, and outcomes would be much more difficult using other common empirical methods, such 
as a cross-sectional survey. The value of the case study approach to our research will become further 
evident in our findings. In particular, informants disclosed some of the unethical practices that occur 
in supply chains that affect SCRES, including corruption, theft, and product counterfeiting. Obtaining 
this insight was possible by meeting the informants face-to-face and building a rapport with them. It is 
unlikely that this insight would have been obtained using, for example, an online survey.  
Our qualitative case study approach generates explanation from analysis rather than testing prior 
hypotheses, and this allows us to develop our particular line of theorising about SCRES (e.g. Ketokivi 
& Choi, 2014). A multiple case study approach is adopted. This aids external validity, guards against 
observer bias (Voss et al., 2002, Barratt et al., 2011), aids triangulation, and creates more testable and 
robust theory (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2009). 
 
3.2 Context and Case Selection  
We studied a network of 20 manufacturing firms located in Kampala (the capital of Uganda) and the 
surrounding industrial areas of Wakiso and Mukono – where the majority of Uganda’s manufacturing 
firms are located (UBS Report, 2011). Uganda is a landlocked country in Sub-Saharan Africa located 
between Southern Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has a 
population of approximately 34.9 million and an income per capita of $706, with 19.7% of people 
living below the poverty line (World Bank Report, 2015). Uganda’s manufacturing sector is growing 
but currently accounts for just 18.4% of GDP – compared to 48% for services and 26.2% for 
agriculture (World Bank Report, 2015). Manufacturing is heavily reliant on imported materials and is 
faced with challenges like high interest rates, poor transportation infrastructure, inadequate skills, and 
power shortages (Obwona et al., 2014). Further, unethical behaviour in commercial transactions is 
common. Employees in Uganda are said to value their social identity more than professionalism, and 
pressures within social relations sometimes produce dishonest behaviour between buyers and 
suppliers (Ntayi et al., 2012). Other problematic practices include adulterating products, mixing good 
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and poor quality products, and refusing to pay suppliers post-delivery (Ntayi et al., 2012). More 
generally, Uganda is considered one of the world’s most corrupt countries, suffering from the politics 
of patronage and interference with the rule of law (Mbabazi & Yu, 2015).  
    The firms participating in the study have been anonymised and are referred to as AU, BU, and so 
on through to TU, with Figure 1 illustrating the network of firms studied and their brief profiles, 
including the number of interviewees per firm and the formal and informal linkages between the 
firms. Following the principles of theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dubois & Araujo, 2007), 
the studied firms had to be in a developing country and connected to one another in a supply network. 
Sampling was also based on emerging findings. For example, it was decided that competitors and 
part-government-owned firms should be incorporated to reflect the recurring themes from the initial 
interviews of unfair competition and corruption. Access began with JU, a brewery where one of the 
authors had previously worked and where it was known several supply chain disruptions had been 
encountered. Employees from JU later facilitated access to three of their suppliers: two sugar 
manufacturers (FU & GU) and one packaging materials producer (DU). The data collected from DU, 
which is the largest manufacturer of packaging materials and other paper products in Uganda, 
revealed disruptions that affected their customers. Hence, their customers were contacted (i.e. BU, 
FU, PU, IU, TU, QU, SU, EU, OU, RU, CU, AU, NU, MU and KU). Some of these companies also 
supplied one another. For example, GU and FU supplied beer manufacturers IU, JU and TU; and EU 
supplied HU, which also supplied OU. The number of companies studied (20) was determined 
following the principle of theoretical saturation – when no new categories or dimensions emerged 
from additional data (e.g. Manuj & Pohlen, 2012).  
 
[Take in Figure 1] 
 
3.3 The Interview Protocol 
Open-ended questions (for semi-structured interviews) were formulated to probe new areas that would 
emerge in the course of data collection, as suggested by Manuj & Pohlen (2012). The first main theme 
concerned what manufacturing firms in Uganda perceived to be the threats of disruption to their 
supply chains. This probed different categories of threats of disruption, e.g. supply-side threats, 
customer or demand-side threats, firm-level threats, and threats external to the supply chain. For each 
threat discussed, interviewees were also asked about the strategies adopted to build resilience and, for 
each strategy, they were further asked about the outcomes of implementation, i.e. whether a strategy 
was successful or had adverse effects. Further probing was undertaken where informants’ accounts 
suggested threats and strategies were connected, in order to understand how and why such 
interrelatedness comes about; and what it could mean for SCRES. A pilot study was conducted using 
face-to-face interviews with three professional managers who had occupied senior positions in 
manufacturing firms. This helped refine the protocol in terms of its clarity and focus. The final 




3.4 Data Collection  
In total, 45 semi-structured, audio-recorded, face-to-face interviews lasting approximately one hour 
each were conducted with managers and other key personnel knowledgeable in supply chain related 
functions. Multiple interviewees per firm were used wherever possible to minimise bias. Interviewees 
were chosen from different authority levels and consisted of a Managing Director, a General 
Manager, 33 managers, and 10 officers in functions related to supply chain, procurement, logistics, 
operations, marketing, and distribution. Interviews were transcribed before the transcripts were sent 
back to the interviewees for validation. We moved back and forth between data collection and 
analysis so the ideas emerging from the data were reconfirmed in new data and new ideas were further 
confirmed by the already collected data, as recommended by Morse et al. (2002). 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The unit of analysis was a supply network fragment, i.e. some portion of the supply network that 
respondents referred to as their ‘supply chains’. Data was analysed following grounded analysis 
principles. The aim was to avoid being constrained by prior theory, to remain open to being surprised 
by the data, and to make sense of the emerging surprises (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). Repeated readings 
of the transcripts were first conducted to understand the data and identify data fragments that referred 
in some way to certain aspects of our research questions. Data analysis was then undertaken at two 
levels, as described below. 
 First, there was a reductionistic analysis to develop a category structure for the data. There were 
three high-level categories: supply chain threats, resilience strategies, and strategy outcomes. A lower 
level set of categories was also developed through cross-case analysis (Barratt et al., 2011), 
comparing different instances of the same code. The category structure was refined by identifying 
differences and similarities among the categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), followed by merging and 
eliminating to reach consistency, as recommended in Miles et al. (2014).  
 The second, integrative level of analysis involved using the transcripts to identify the dynamic, 
causal connections between the threats (and conditions that lead to threats), strategies, and outcomes 
that had been described by the interviewees. This produced a second network – not of firms but of 
conditions leading to a threat, threats, strategies, and outcomes – that cut across firms. In this 
additional network, each node is a condition, threat, strategy, or outcome with incoming and outgoing 
links. The edges linking the nodes are causes. The full network was constructed using Gephi software 
but this network is too large and densely populated to enable the clear labelling of nodes and links, 
and so presenting it in its entirety would add little value. In Section 5, we will present a table (Table 
IV) that summarises the data, and we will describe two fragments of the full network to illustrate the 
nature of the interconnectedness. It was at this point in the analysis that we found many of the inter-
relationships themselves also needed explanation – and the importance of context in explaining these 
inter-relationships led us to adopt an embeddedness perspective (see Section 5.3). For example, 
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threats such as corruption, product counterfeiting, unfair competition, and dishonest employees 
originated from the supply network’s embeddedness in a developing country characterised by weak 
political and legal controls.  
 
4. First Level Analysis: Categorisation of Threats, Strategies and Outcomes 
This section briefly outlines the first level analysis, where the data is categorised according to supply 
chain threats, SCRES strategies, and corresponding outcomes. This categorisation is illustrated in 
Table II. 
 
[Take in Table II] 
 
Supply chain threats were divided into the following two types:  
 Endogenous threats originating from within the supply chain, which were then further divided into: 
(i) supply-side threats of disruption originating from upstream; (ii) firm level threats originating 
from within the focal company; and, (iii) demand-side threats originating from downstream.  
 Exogenous threats originating from outside the supply chain, which were further divided into: (i) 
geopolitical; and, (ii) economic threats.  
 
From the interview data, it became clear that interviewees had a broad understanding of the term 
“threat”. Some responses referred to threatening events and others to threatening conditions that 
produced or compounded a threat. Table II revealed that the case study firms are mostly concerned 
with smaller in scale, chronic threats of disruption, e.g. product counterfeiting, raw material delays, 
financial difficulties, machine breakdowns, etc. rather than large-scale discrete events. Only five 
interviewees highlighted natural disasters while 17 referred to machine breakdowns and 20 to raw 
material delays & shortages. In Table III, we provide example quotations from the interviewees for 
the six categories of threats marked with an asterisk in Table II. These specific threats appear 
particularly relevant to the context of the study. For example, the threat of political instabilities arose 
from being located in a landlocked country and relying on politically unstable Kenya as a transit route 
to a sea port. This makes political disruption that impedes transportation to, and through, Kenyan 
ports a problem for Ugandan suppliers and distributors. The threats were also often inter-related. For 
example, JU reported that the threat of financial difficulties results in late payment to workers. In 
retaliation, workers cause new disruptions, e.g. by destroying machines and deliberately producing 
poor quality products. The analysis of this inter-relatedness will be developed further in Section 5.   
 
[Take in Table III] 
 
Table II also includes a detailed list of the SCRES strategies applied by the firms, and the 
outcomes of implementing strategies where possible – not all strategies had specified outcomes in our 
data. From the outcomes, it is clear that the interviewees were mostly concerned with adverse or 
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unexpected outcomes of adopting a particular strategy, e.g. side-effects or new threats, although 
clearly there will be positive outcomes of adopting SCRES strategies. Further, the strategies reported 
are also evidently inter-related – threats lead to strategies, which can sometimes have adverse 
outcomes that require further strategies to deal with them, and potentially further negative side-
effects. This inter-relatedness of outcomes, like the inter-relatedness of threats, appears fundamental 
to how supply chains behave when any attempt is made to intervene in them. The second level 
analysis, in the next section, is therefore focused on the interconnectedness of threats, strategies, and 
outcomes. 
 
5. Second Level Analysis: Interconnectedness of Threats, Strategies and Outcomes  
The interviews and first level analysis revealed instances of interconnectedness between threats, 
strategies, and outcomes. The second level analysis therefore involved: (i) identifying all instances in 
the data when informants described a causal connection between, or among, the threats (and 
associated conditions), strategies, and outcomes identified in Section 4; and, (ii) assembling these into 
a causal network, as briefly described in Section 3.5. The most important nodes in this network, in 
terms of the number of incoming and outgoing links to the nodes, are given in Table IV. The network 
consists of 90 nodes in total, but space precludes showing the entire table. Therefore, Table IV is 
limited to the nodes with over ten links (22 nodes) and a further five nodes that are particularly 
relevant to our discussion. 
 
[Take in Table IV] 
 
 There are certain nodes with large numbers of both incoming and outgoing links – such as the 
threats of raw material delays and shortages (25 links in or causes and 29 links out or outcomes), 
financial difficulties (for the focal firm: 18 links in and 12 links out), and poor quality raw materials 
(8 links in and 13 links out). Such nodes have many antecedents and many consequents, e.g. being a 
side-effect of a strategy aimed at managing some other threat. Such highly connected threats (or hubs) 
are difficult to control because they influence resilience in multiple ways. Interestingly, the top ranked 
nodes in Table IV are all threats that are internal to the supply chain, which suggests that the most 
important threats to SCRES are perceived to be endogenous rather than exogenous. Moreover, most 
are chronic, continuous problems, e.g. product counterfeiting, machine breakdowns, demand 
variations, supplier delivery failures, etc. A discrete and potentially catastrophic threat like natural 
disasters, for example, had only 5 outgoing links (and no clear causes). An analysis of the links 
between nodes showed that there are a relatively small number of nodes with a large number of links. 
For example, there is only one node with over 30 links, 2 nodes with 26-30 links, but 68 nodes with 
10 or less links each. To give a better idea of the qualitative nature of the relationships in this network, 




5.1 Example Network Fragment One: Effects of Limited Local Supply Market on SCRES 
The first example starts with the threat of a limited local supply market (see Figure 2, beginning from 
the box to the left-hand side labelled “limited local supply market”). Sixteen firms (AU, CU, EU, FU, 
HU, IU, JU, KU, LU, MU, NU, PU, QU, RU, SU, & TU) highlighted the threat of a limited local 
supply market. Twelve of these firms argued that this leads to long distance sourcing, resulting in the 
upstream threat of delays and shortages of raw materials and spares. If a firm runs out of raw 
materials, this can halt production, which then disrupts the downstream network. In CU, long distance 
sourcing causes communication and information flow problems, which make it difficult to establish 
collaborative relationships with suppliers, causing further delays and shortages. Some firms (e.g. AU, 
FU, LU, & PU) respond to raw material shortages from long distance sourcing by maintaining 
strategic stocks. But this increases stock holding costs, including the costs of theft, and ties up 
working capital, particularly for expensive materials and spares. This results in the threat of running 
into financial difficulties. AU’s Marketing Manager stated: “Our source of raw materials is far away. 
So we keep stocks for at least five months to cater for delays. For example, materials arriving from 
Japan can take three months, which ties [up] our capital and creates financial problems.” Further, the 
financial difficulties resulting from maintaining strategic stocks mean firms fail to pay suppliers or 
customs on time, resulting in a circular effect – the return of (further) material delays and shortages. 
JU’s Procurement & Logistics Officer explained: “We place orders, but deliveries are delayed due to 
a lack of finances, for example to pay for customs clearance – sometimes because money is tied [up] 
in inventory ... [we] lack enough raw materials and this affects our production.”  
 
[Take in Figure 2] 
 
 Firms such as IU, KU, PU, & RU indicated that they use local sourcing to mitigate the disruptions 
caused by long distance suppliers, but they conceded that this compromises quality, which negatively 
affects their downstream customers. Some companies (e.g. AU, CU, JU, LU, MU, PU, RU, & SU) 
indicated that they mitigate delays by developing collaborative relationships with suppliers, but AU, 
JU, and PU argued that forming deep relationships limits flexibility to switch suppliers when faced 
with a crisis, causing further delays and shortages.  
 LU, PU, and RU also reported that co-opetition, a form of collaboration with rival firms, helps 
create resilience against raw material delays and shortages. Interviewees claimed that they borrow 
materials from other firms (without interest) and replace the goods when their consignment arrives. 
PU’s Procurement Manager stated: “We work together with our competitors by getting raw materials 
from them and replacing them when ours are delivered … This kind of arrangement is facilitated by 
our networks as managers. We know each other and we communicate during crises to bail each other 
out.” This co-opetition strategy, based on informal networks and social relations, is not part of the 
formal supply chain. It therefore shows how SCRES may emerge from a mutual interaction between 
the system and other independent, rival systems. The data also shows that this is facilitated by the 
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embeddedness of the supply network, as will be explained in Section 5.3. Informants from LU, for 
example, reported that they exchange information with competitors to mitigate threats, e.g. reporting 
on dishonest distributors. But it was also revealed that co-opetition can present confidentiality risks. 
For example, PU’s Brand Manager stated: “We do not collaborate with some of our competitors for 
confidentiality reasons”. PU’s Procurement Manager also indicated that some competitors use their 
informal, social networks to bribe government officials to evade or pay fewer taxes, which results in 
unfair competition. 
The effects described above produce non-linearity in that there is no simple, linear relationship 
between the disturbances experienced by the supply network and the reliability and availability of the 
final product – because they are mediated by a series of adaptations and effects within the network. 
This non-linearity seemed clear to the informants. For example, IU’s Finance Manager explained: “a 
quality problem was initially seen as small but later turned out to affect the whole supply chain. It 
started from the supplier with poor quality materials, meaning we produced poor quality items, which 
we delivered to customers. The complaints that followed, including litigation, affected our entire 
system”. The threat of a disturbance (delays and shortages of spares and raw materials) is shaped by 
another threat (limited local supply market), which triggers a condition (long distance sourcing), with 
the adaptation to this (e.g. maintaining strategic stocks) creating other threats (such as financial losses 
from tying capital up in stock). This in turn can lead to other threats and circular effects, including the 
reoccurrence of the original threat (e.g. raw material delays and shortages) but with different 
antecedents (e.g. a failure to pay suppliers or customs). Firms such as CU further revealed that they 
find it difficult to implement SCRES strategies (e.g. collaboration with suppliers) against other threats 
due to communication barriers and poor information flow created by long distances from suppliers. 
Thus, a particular condition can affect resilience through multiple routes – first, by producing threats; 
and second, by constraining the implementation of other resilience strategies.  
This analysis shows that the consequences of a particular threat and/or condition, as well as the 
mitigating strategies, can propagate through the supply network. Thus, in the process of trying to 
attain resilience, risk shifts or migrates rather than being resolved, e.g. as one threat becomes 
transformed into another. This migration of one kind of risk to another is generally accompanied by a 
movement from one point in the supply network to another (e.g. from upstream to downstream) – and 
this will be further revealed in the second example. In this first example, an attempt to mitigate a 
threat originating from the supply side caused firm level threats, such as financial difficulties, which 
affected both the upstream and downstream supply chain. 
 
5.2 Example Network Fragment Two: The Threat and Consequences of Dishonest Employees  
The second example starts with the threat of dishonest employees (see Figure 3, beginning from the 
box to the top left-hand side labelled “dishonest employees”). Twelve firms (GU, LU, IU, TU, JU, 
KU, EU, HU, BU, AU, NU, & PU) indicated that dishonest employees disrupt the production and 
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delivery of their products through, for example, product adulteration, which leads to poor quality 
products that affect a firm’s reputation with its customers; malicious machine damages (leading to 
breakdowns), which also affect product quality and require stock holding (with its associated 
problems); and stock theft, which has direct financial implications for the firm. Firms such as BU, 
EU, and HU argued that the culture of dishonesty through connivance is deeply entrenched in 
employees. But dishonest behaviour is sometimes caused by the late payment of salaries (due to 
financial difficulties). For example, JU’s Regional Sales Manager explained that their field-based 
sales personnel sometimes disappear with company money when salaries are delayed. Likewise, the 
Procurement Manager of JU, a brewery, commented that workers: “…stop working, destroy 
machines, destabilize the processes and produce poor quality beer intentionally. Sometimes, we are 
unable to supply or we supply spoilt beer.” Such behaviour produces an obvious non-linearity for the 
network, whereby relatively minor perturbations become amplified through cycles of repeated delay 
and protest, as evident in the closed loops of causation in Figure 3. Indeed, TU’s Trade Marketing 
Manager explained: “Late staff payment is a problem that started small but has eventually affected 
the whole supply chain. Production is affected, the market is affected and we fail to get cash inflows 
to pay our suppliers.” Firms such as BU attempt to overcome financial difficulties so they can pay 
employees by using financial management strategies (e.g. by reducing customer credit limits and 
demanding cash payments). But this leads to reputational risk and the loss of customers, further 
reducing financial inflows. BU’s Export Manager noted: “The company policy makers have decided 
to demand cash transactions and this has made some customers abandon us and shift to our 
competitors, further reducing our sales revenue.”  
 
[Take in Figure 3] 
 
Employee misbehaviour is a disruption threat in its own right, but it also produces other threats, 
e.g. financial difficulties, and limits the implementation of SCRES strategies against other threats. For 
example, stock theft hinders the use of strategic stocks for safeguarding against shortages and delivery 
failures, as noted by HU’s Marketing Manager: “Sometimes, we store a lot of cement but we have 
thieves [employees]…sometimes we run out of stock unexpectedly, affecting clients and the company 
… we cannot fulfil the orders, which reduces our cash flows.” Respondents from JU argued that a loss 
of income due to employee misbehaviour results in further staff payment problems, which in turn 
leads to further misbehaviour – a vicious cycle, as illustrated in Figure 4 (beginning from the top left 
of the figure). 
 
[Take in Figure 4] 
 
In general, the data again showed that interventions in the form of strategies aimed at responding 
to threats do not have simple, self-contained outcomes. Adaptations and consequences propagate over 
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time and space. And the relationships between the threats experienced by the network and the ultimate 
effects are evidently non-linear and generally stochastic. The result is the migration of supply chain 
risks and a process of continuing adaptation. This still leaves the question of what lies behind this 
interrelatedness. We have observed how the initiating threats in our examples above, and many of the 
causal influences that have been discussed, characterise the Ugandan context. It is the context that 
seems to produce the difficulty of partitioning the different elements of resilience – the multiple 
threats and strategies. This is supported by Table IV, where most of the nodes that have no incoming 
links are grounded in the context, e.g. government policy, corruption, insufficient skilled manpower, 
and geographical location (landlockedness). Hence, an embeddedness theoretical framework is 
adopted in Section 5.3 to understand how the presence of the supply network, or part of it, in a 
developing country affects its resilience. Section 5.4 then focuses in more detail on the phenomenon 
of risk migration, which appears to arise from the embeddedness of the supply network. 
 
5.3 The Embeddedness Perspective on SCRES 
Embeddedness is a multi-disciplinary concept that has been given a number of different meanings 
(e.g. Polanyi, 1944; Granovetter, 1985; Halinen & Törnroos, 1998; Hess, 2004). For example, Hess 
(2004) defined embeddedness “as the set of social relationships between economic and non-economic 
actors (individuals as well as aggregate groups of individuals, i.e. organisations), which in turn create 
distinctive patterns of constraints and incentives for economic action and behaviour”. Meanwhile, 
Halinen & Törnroos (1998) defined embeddedness as “companies' relations with, and dependence on, 
various types of networks.” What is common to all definitions of embeddedness is the idea that 
economic actors exist in, and are influenced by, networks of relationships with other economic or 
non-economic actors, either directly or indirectly (Choi & Kim, 2008). Thus, embeddedness can be 
both voluntary and involuntary. Researchers from different disciplines have provided different 
perspectives to explain who is embedded in what. For example, economic sociologists maintain that 
economic behaviour, individuals and companies are embedded in networks of ongoing social relations 
(Hess, 2004). Organisational and business studies scholars argue that firms and networks are 
embedded in time, space, social structures, markets, technological systems, and political systems, 
while economic geographers stipulate that firms are embedded in networks and institutional settings 
of local or regional geographical scale (Hess, 2004). 
     Scholars have suggested various categories of embeddedness. For example, Halinen & Törnroos 
(1998) proposed six types: social, political, market, technological, temporal, and spatial 
embeddedness. Meanwhile, Hess (2004), drawing on Polanyi (1944), Granovetter (1985), and Halinen 
& Törnroos (1998), proposed three categories: network (including structural and relational), societal 
(including cultural and political), and territorial embeddedness. This particular categorisation seems 
especially relevant to our findings, although our interest here is not in the way that a supply chain 
embeds a particular organisation, but in the way the supply chain is embedded in a developing country 
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– thus we do not include network embeddedness.  In contrast, most prior supply chain research that 
has adopted an embeddedness perspective, with the recent exception of Wu & Pullman (2015), has 
focused almost exclusively on network (structural and relational) embeddedness. Moreover, prior 
work has portrayed embeddedness as an entirely positive phenomenon or facilitator (e.g. Choi & Kim, 
2008; Gligor & Autry, 2012; Kim, 2014). Indeed, embeddedness can improve collaboration, 
adaptation, and responsiveness (Uzzi, 1997). However, embeddedness can also be a source of 
constraint, e.g. by promoting unethical practices (Granovetter, 1985) and increasing vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks and information asymmetry (Uzzi, 1997). This can be clearly understood if we 
consider the broader context in which the supply network is embedded, rather than how the supply 
network embeds entities within it. We focus on the following three categories of embeddedness: 
1. Cultural embeddedness: the collective understanding of beliefs, values and symbols, which 
provide scripts that guide economic strategies and goals (Dequech, 2003). 
2. Political embeddedness: the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a 
struggle for power that involves economic actors and non-market institutions, including national 
policies and state legal frameworks (Hardy et al., 2005). 
3. Territorial embeddedness: concerning the geographical location of business, e.g. proximity, and 
different networks of relationships in that location (Halinen & Törnroos, 1998)  
 
Table V summarises the key aspects of embeddedness contained in the data, where much of the 
focus is on cultural embeddedness, and the associated threats. As can be observed from Table V, the 
three categories can overlap. For example, although a factor such as corruption can be analysed from 
a cultural perspective – where people may view it as a norm – it can also be argued to be a political 
factor arising from a weak legal system, government policy, or a lack of political will. Similarly, 
factors such as a weak legal system could be perpetuated by culture, such as when the civil society 
legitimises bribery. Further, a supply network may be embedded in political and cultural milieus due 
to its territorial embeddedness, e.g. being located in a generally underdeveloped continent 
experiencing political immaturity and economic constraints. 
 
[Take in Table V] 
 
 We found some evidence in our data that embeddedness can enable SCRES. For example, we 
described earlier a specific kind of co-opetition, where competitors borrow raw materials from each 
other to mitigate raw material delays. This co-opetition is facilitated by the actors’ involvement in 
informal networks, which develop in a supportive cultural context. However, it was also found that 
embeddedness is a source of threat. Firms such as BU and CU attributed specific threats, such as 
delays and damage to fragile consignments – as a result of poor transportation infrastructure – to the 
embeddedness of the supply network in a political and cultural context that exacerbates corruption. 
JU’s Procurement Manager argued: “This poor road network should be attributed to a lack of 
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political will and corruption in African countries including Uganda. It is public knowledge. 
Corruption has now become part of the government and our daily activities. No bribe, no service, no 
survival.” Other threats were found to originate from territorial embeddedness, such as being located 
far away from the source of raw materials and in a landlocked country, which creates vulnerability to 
political instabilities in the transit route country. For example, PU’s Procurement Manager explained: 
“When there was political violence in Kenya, all manufacturing companies in Uganda ran out of 
stocks of raw materials … They could not be delivered via Mombasa.” 
     It was also found that some SCRES strategies yielded unexpected adverse outcomes as a result of 
embeddedness. For example, maintaining strategic stocks to guard against the raw material delays and 
shortages that result from long distance sourcing can become ineffective due to the cultural 
acceptability of theft by employees. Further, although informal networking can create resilience 
against certain threats (e.g. financial difficulties and raw material delays) and reinforce strategies (e.g. 
co-opetition), it can also act as a barrier to SCRES due to cultural and political embeddedness (e.g. 
when firms use their informal networks to avoid taxes). JU’s Procurement & Logistics Officer stated: 
“Some competitors lobby the government and dodge or pay low taxes. There is corruption in 
government where beneficiaries pay less or no tax and end up charging a lower price, which affects 
our customer base.”  
     Being voluntarily embedded in one aspect sometimes implies automatic embeddedness in another. 
In the data, for example, being (voluntarily) territorially embedded in a landlocked country (e.g. as a 
location decision) implies also being embedded in the conditions of the transit neighbouring country 
involuntarily. This shows that embeddedness can be complex (e.g. a combination of territorial and 
political), and this can produce threats that would not occur if the embeddedness were simple. Being 
embedded in a landlocked country need not be a threat to a firm’s SCRES in itself; nor need be 
political instability in a neighbouring country.   
 
5.4 Supply Chain Risk Migration 
Our findings demonstrate that threats and strategies are interrelated in a more complex way than a 
given threat simply leading to the adoption of a particular strategy. The strategies adopted to build 
SCRES may produce adverse outcomes in the form of new or former threats, either at the same or a 
different point of the supply network. Equally, resilience strategies may conflict or mutually reinforce 
each other. The relationships between supply chain phenomena, and the points where they occur in 
the supply chain, were reportedly caused by the factors emanating from the context in which the 
supply chains are situated. This suggests that the way the supply chain becomes a system is explained 
by its embeddedness – because it is the embeddedness that produces or explains the nature of many of 
the relationships between threats, strategies, etc. This embeddedness contributes to the phenomenon 
of risk migration in the supply chain that was noted earlier; and risk migration implies that resilience 
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is an unending process of responding and adapting both to threats and to the outcomes of prior 
adaptations.  
The supply chain risk migration matrix introduced in Figure 5 illustrates that, in the process of 
creating SCRES, a threat can migrate from one form to another and/or from one point in the supply 
network to another. The horizontal axis in Figure 5 represents the threat (T) while the vertical axis 
represents the point in the supply network (N), e.g. in the upstream or downstream. The bottom left-
hand quadrant (T1NA) represents the initial network point NA, which is threatened by T1. An attempt 
is therefore made to mitigate threat T1. Risk migration may manifest in three forms, i.e. T2NA, 
T1NB, or T2NB. The bottom right-hand quadrant, T2NA, shows the transformation of a threat T1 into 
another threat T2 at the same point in the network NA. For example, mitigating the upstream threat of 
raw material delays and shortages by keeping strategic stocks resulted in financial difficulties, leading 
to another upstream threat of loss of reputation with suppliers due to a failure to pay them. The top 
left-hand quadrant, T1NB, shows the migration of original threat T1 to a different point in the 
network (NB). For example, mitigating the threat of financial difficulties resulting from defaulting 
customers by demanding cash payments resulted in a reduced customer base and cash inflows – 
leading to an upstream threat of failure to pay suppliers (financial difficulties). Finally, the top right-
hand quadrant, T2NB, shows the migration of a threat (T1 to T2) and of the point in the network 
where the threat is experienced (NA to NB). For example, to mitigate the upstream threat of dishonest 
suppliers who adulterated products and supplied poor quality materials, some companies screened 
quality at suppliers’ sites and conducted audits. But this caused raw material delays, which disrupted 
production schedules and led to the downstream threat of late delivery to customers and a reduced 
customer base. 
 
[Take in Figure 5] 
 
It is important to be aware of the phenomenon of risk migration when implementing strategies to 
build SCRES. The matrix in Figure 5 reminds us that threats and strategies are interconnected. The 
fact that SCRES strategies produce unexpected adverse outcomes informs managers that SCRES 
should not be viewed as a static phenomenon; and the capacity to adapt should be built into the 
system so it has the flexibility to respond to different manifestations of threats. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Few empirical studies on Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) have been reported in the literature, and 
those that have been conducted have focused on a developed country context. There has been a need 
to investigate the perceived threats of disruption to supply chains in developing countries as well as 
developed countries and to examine how firms attempt to create resilience to these threats. While 
prior SCRES empirical studies have emphasised large-scale, discrete, catastrophic and exogenous 
threats (e.g. Rice & Caniato, 2003; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013), our findings 
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suggest that firms in a developing country are mainly concerned with smaller in scale, chronic threats 
of disruption, many of which are endogenous. Non-linearities inherent in the supply networks mean 
that these chronic threats may have considerable consequences for resilience. This adds to our 
understanding of what is perceived to be important to building supply chain resilience. 
Against this backdrop, our study makes the following main contributions: 
1. Our findings show that resilience, and the conditions that influence it, require an understanding of 
the interconnectedness of threats, strategies, and their outcomes. This is different to the 
perspective typically adopted in the extant literature where it appears to be suggested that 
resilience is about identifying threats and determining corresponding strategies (e.g. Pettit et al., 
2013). In contrast, our study suggests that resilience is not linear and is a continual process, which 
logically suggests that it is non-stationary and can be gained or lost over time. This relates to the 
phenomenon of supply chain risk migration, whereby implementing a resilience strategy may 
produce another threat, either at the same or a different point in the supply network. The concept 
of risk migration can be traced to the risk literature (e.g. Grabowski & Roberts, 1997; Alcock & 
Busby, 2006), but it has not previously been expressly considered in SCRES research. 
2. Our findings highlight that resilience requires that consideration be given to the context in which 
the supply chain is embedded. The embeddedness perspective emphasises how the environment 
brings about the connections between threats, strategies, and outcomes. Prior empirical SCRES 
research has focussed only on the strategies for building SCRES (Hohenstein et al., 2015) without 
systemically considering the threats that provoke such strategies and their outcomes. Moreover, 
our study goes beyond previous supply chain research where embeddedness has been portrayed as 
a purely positive concept, and beyond its prior primary focus on the structural and relational 
dimensions of embeddedness (e.g. Choi & Kim, 2008; Gligor & Autry, 2012; Kim, 2014). 
Further, although embeddedness has been linked to supply chain risk (e.g. Song et al., 2012), and 
to both adaptation and responsiveness (Uzzi, 1997), it has not previously been applied to facilitate 
understanding of SCRES. 
 
6.1. The Importance of Context 
The literature on SCRES has thus far focused on the developed world; hence this work contributes 
towards providing greater representation in the SCRES literature of developing country contexts. 
These countries typically lag behind, for example, in terms of the level of industry maturity, business 
practices, governance structures, and infrastructures. Thus, the threats faced by firms and supply 
chains in developing countries, and the way in which these threats are handled, may differ from the 
developed country context that has been largely studied in the SCRES literature; but further research 
has been required in developing country contexts to explore this.  
The particular setting for this study has been the developing country of Uganda where informants 
were especially concerned about the resilience of their supply chains to relatively small-in-scale, 
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chronic problems – far less so with the large-scale, catastrophic events emphasised in the literature 
(e.g. hurricanes, terrorism, etc.). The theory frame of embeddedness has proven to be an important 
lens for making sense of the conditions, threats, strategies, and outcomes encountered in the Ugandan 
context. Table V, for example, identified the political, cultural, and territorial aspects of 
embeddedness that were revealed in the data and that contributed in some way to the threats that 
manifested in the fragment of the supply network that we have studied. In this work, important 
territorial aspects included landlockedness, political aspects included political instability and a weak 
legal system, and cultural aspects included corruption and product counterfeiting. It seems likely that 
the combination of aspects contained in Table V will be relatively unique to Uganda, but other 
contexts will feature some of these aspects and potentially others that are not identified in this data. 
Hence, further research is required in other developing country contexts, including from an 
embeddedness perspective. Of course, aspects of embeddedness were also evident in how firms 
responded to the threats, including co-opetition, whereby competitors borrow raw materials from each 
other to mitigate raw material delays, which was linked to the importance of social ties and informal 
networks that develop in Uganda’s cultural context. It is important that this, more supportive aspect of 
the context that we have studied is not overlooked.  
Although the work is situated in Uganda, it is argued to be of wider relevance, and not only 
because of the global nature of supply chains and the flow of goods into and out of Uganda to other 
nations around the world. We have demonstrated how understanding the political, cultural, and 
territorial context in which a supply network is embedded is key to understanding the threats of 
disruption to the supply chain and the interrelatedness of threats, strategies, and outcomes. 
Embeddedness creates complexity in the threat-strategy-outcome network, and this constrains 
resilience as it means it is difficult to intervene in the system in a definite way – aspects of 
embeddedness create unanticipated outcomes from an intervention. This reflects the more general 
principle of the importance of context and its influence on operations and supply chain management 
related phenomena such as resilience. Moreover, although the particular underlying causes of the 
phenomenon we have identified may be specific to Uganda, supply chain risk migration is argued to 
be a much more widely relevant phenomenon that will be important in other settings than Uganda. 
 
6.2 Managerial Implications and Future Research  
This study revealed that threats of disruption and SCRES strategies are interconnected. Strategies 
should thus not be considered in isolation because their implementation may either reinforce or 
contradict other strategies. If they reinforce each other, such strategies could be applied together as a 
bundle to maximise their complementarity. Managers should be aware of potential risk migration 
from one threat to another when crafting strategies to build SCRES. Equally, the potential for risk 
migration across the supply network means that rather than looking at their operation in isolation, 
managers should look at the supply chain holistically because actors along the chain are so 
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interconnected. Managers should also be aware that the threats to the resilience of their supply chains 
are not necessarily large-scale discrete events – they are also events of continuous possibilities. 
Hence, they should not underestimate seemingly small but chronic events because they are capable of 
gradually weakening the supply network, resulting in either major consequences (due to non-linearity) 
or a reduced capability to respond to future catastrophic events. Furthermore, this study is not only of 
relevance to managers in developing countries but also to global sourcing managers buying from 
developing countries. Managers in general need to be aware of the context in which their supply 
chains are embedded if they are to understand the potential threats and the conditions that might 
render their SCRES strategies ineffective; and mapping out the kind of network we have used in our 
analysis may be a useful approach for managers in understanding the interconnectedness of threats 
and the consequences of their interventions.  
Although our case study approach provides rich data, it has focused on a specific network of firms 
in a narrow range of industries and within a single country. It thus has limited generalisability. It was 
also cross-sectional in nature, which limits our understanding of the longitudinal process of adaptation 
in building SCRES. We found that SCRES involves continuously adapting to smaller in scale, chronic 
threats as well as to the consequences of such adaptations, which depicts SCRES as a dynamic 
process rather than a static attribute of a supply chain. This requires longitudinal observation to 
understand fully, and longitudinal data is also needed to understand how resilience is gained or lost 
over time. Finally, Figure 5 illustrated the supply chain risk migration phenomenon identified in the 
data. This could be further developed in future research. For example, the vertical axis refers to the 
point in the supply network where a threat is located (or has migrated towards), i.e. NA vs. NB. This 
could be expanded to reflect both up and downstream migration or to indicate the proximity/distance 
from the previous point where the threat was located. The horizontal axis refers to the threat 
encountered and whether this is the same threat as before or whether mitigation has created a new 
threat, i.e. T1 vs. T2. This could be expanded, for example, to reflect changes in the probability or 
impact of a threat on the supply network. 
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Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
General information 
 Interviewee information 
- Job title and description 
- Years spent in the position and company 
- How does your role link in with the supply chain decision-making processes? 
 
 Company information 
- Company name and industry sector 
- Business starting date 
- Number of employees and average turnover for the last two years  
- Nature of operation (incl. multinational or domestic, mode of entry)  
- What is the nature of your products, e.g. standard, variety, customised? 
- Your major suppliers (main countries/ regions) 
- Your major customers (main countries/ regions) 
- Strategic objectives of this company (e.g. cost leadership, differentiation, focus on a particular 
segment, etc.) 
 
Supply Chain Threats, Resilience Strategies, and Outcomes 
 Please describe the threats to your supply chains 
- Supply related threats originating from suppliers 
- Firm level threats originating from the focal firms but affecting the upstream or downstream 
- Customer related threats originating from the downstream 
- External threats originating from outside the supply chain  
 
 What strategies do you apply to build resilience against each of the threats you mentioned? 
- Demand management strategies 
- Supply management strategies 
- Relationship management strategies 
- Information management strategies, etc. 
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Table I: Summary of Proactive and Reactive SCRES Strategies 
 














Appropriate supplier selection/Procurement – Using selection criteria that can help to 
minimise disruptions and their impact, such as political stability in suppliers’ territories, 
quality, capabilities (e.g. technological), financial stability, business continuity, 
reliability, etc. 
Pereira et al. (2014); Rajesh & Ravi (2015) 
Building logistics capabilities – Capabilities for managing supply and information flows 
necessary for minimising vulnerabilities, e.g. risk hedging capabilities, information 
technology upgrades, and information sharing.  
Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009) 
Building security – Measures to protect the supply chain against deliberate disruptions, 
e.g. theft, terrorism, and the infiltration of counterfeits. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Barksh & Kleindorfer (2009); Pettit et 
al. (2010) 
Building social capital and relational competences – Effective communication and 
information sharing before the risk event increases risk awareness and  limits 
vulnerability, e.g. communication, cooperation, trust, reciprocity, etc.  
Johnson et al. (2013); Wieland & Wallenburg (2013) 
Co-opetition – Creating and maintaining collaboration between competitors so as to gain 
from synergies, e.g. sharing resources for building security & resilience. 
Barksh & Kleindorfer (2009); Borekci et al. (2014) 
Creating appropriate contractual agreements – Long term and short term contracts that 
can enable flexibility in supply to minimise shortages. 
Urciuoli et al. (2014) 
Collaboration with the government/ Creating public-private partnerships /  – 
Contractual agreement between a public agency and a private sector entity to share skills 
& assets, risks and rewards in order to deliver services or facilities to the general public. 
It increases government interest in private entities’ supply chains. 
Gong et al. (2014); Urciuoli et al. (2014); Yang & Xu (2015) 
Creating a risk management culture – Ensuring that all organisational members embrace 
supply chain risk management, and this involves, e.g. top management support and firm 
integration/team work. 
Christopher & Peck (2004); Sheffi & Rice (2005); Leat & 
Revoredo (2013) 
Increasing innovativeness – The motivation and capability to seek and invent new 
business ideas, e.g. new products, technologies, processes and strategies that can reduce 
vulnerability. 
Golgeci & Ponomarov (2013) 
Increasing visibility – The ability to see through the entire supply chain (all nodes and 
links), which helps to identify potential threats. 
Pettit et al. (2010); Zhang et al. (2011); Saenz & Revilla (2014) 
Inventory management – The strategic alignment of inventory management using a 
system-wide approach to minimise inventory risks 
Boone et al. (2013) 
Knowledge management – Developing knowledge and understanding of supply chain Rice & Caniato (2003); Christopher & Peck (2004); Ponomarov 
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structures (i.e. physical and informational), and the ability to learn from changes as well 
as educate other entities. 
& Holcomb (2009); Jüttner & Maklan (2011); Ponis & Koronis 
(2012); Scholten et al. (2014) 
Portfolio diversification– Indulging in different products to reduce dependence on 
particular products and suppliers.  
Urciuoli et al. (2014) 
Supplier development – Facilitating suppliers with incentives, e.g. financial, training and 
technical knowledge to improve efficiency, commitment and reliability. 
Tang (2006); Leat & Revoredo (2013) 
Supply chain collaboration – The ability to work effectively with other supply chain 
entities for mutual benefit, e.g. sharing information and other resources to reduce 
vulnerability. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Christopher & Peck (2004); Bakshi & 
Kleindorfer (2009); Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009); Pettit et al. 
(2010); Jüttner & Maklan (2011); Zhang et al. (2011); Ponis & 
Koronis (2012); Leat & Revoredo (2013); Brandon-Jones et al. 
(2014); Scholten et al. (2014); Scholten &Schilder  (2015) 
Supply chain network structure/ design – Constructing the supply chain network for 
resilience, e.g. balancing redundancy, efficiency, vulnerabilities, etc. 
Leat & Revoredo (2013); Kristianto et al. (2014); Gong et al. 
(2015); Scholten et al. (2014); Cardoso et al. (2015); Levalle & 
Nof  (2015) 
Sustainability compliance – Compliance to economic, social and environmental 
requirements to mitigate associated supply chain risks, e.g. reputational risks. 
Soni & Jain (2011) 
Use of information technology – Information technology enhances connectivity and 
supports other resilience strategies, e.g. visibility and collaboration, which can help in 
signalling potential disruptions. 













Building logistics capabilities – Capabilities for supply and information flows, e.g. to 
reduce cycle times, increase delivery competence, knowledge management and customer 
service to quickly recover from a disruption. 
Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009) 
Building social capital and relational competences – Effective communication, trust and 
information sharing can enable rapid access to resources necessary for recovery, e.g. 
communication, cooperation, trust, reciprocity, etc.   
Johnson et al. (2013); Wieland & Wallenburg (2013) 
Contingency planning – Anticipating potential events and specifying the measures to 
deal with supply chain risks and disruptions before they actually occur, e.g. by 
forecasting and monitoring early warning signals. 
Tang (2006); Pettit et al. (2010); Urciuoli et al. (2014); Cardoso 
et al. (2015); Das & Lashkari (2015) 
Contingency re-routing – Using alternative routes (transportation) as a contingency 
measure in case of the threat of disruption to the current route, e.g. turbulence and bad 
weather at sea 
Wang et al. (2015) 
Creating redundancy – The strategic and selective use of spare capacity and inventory 
that can be used to cope with disruptions, e.g. spare stocks, multiple suppliers and extra 
facilities. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Sheffi & Rice (2005); Tang (2006); 
Zsidisin & Wagner (2010); Azevedo et al. (2011); Ponis & 
Koronis (2012); Kristianto et al.( 2014); Saenz & Revilla (2014); 
Urciuoli et al. (2014); Wang et al. (2015) 
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Demand management – Mitigating the impact of disruptions by influencing customer 
choices through, e.g. dynamic pricing, assortment planning and silent product rollovers. 
Tang (2006); Urciuoli et al. (2014) 
Ensuring supply chain agility – The ability to respond quickly to unpredictable changes 
in demand and/or supply. 
Christopher & Peck (2004); Carvalho et al. (2012); Ponis & 
Koronis (2012); Scholten et al. (2014) 
Increasing flexibility – The ability of a firm and supply chain to adapt to changing 
requirements with minimum time and effort. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Sheffi & Rice (2005); Tang (2006); 
Pettit et al. (2010); Zsidisin & Wagner (2010); Azevedo et al. 
(2011); Ponis & Koronis (2012); Geng et al. (2014); Ambulkar 
et al., 2015). 
Increasing velocity – The pace of flexible adaptations that can determine the recovery 
speed of the supply chain from a disruption. 
Carvalho et al. (2012) 
Increasing visibility – The ability to see through the entire supply chain (all nodes and 
links) so as to effectively respond to a disruption. 
Pettit et al. (2010); Brandon-Jones et al. (2014); Saenz & Revilla 
(2014)  
Supply chain collaboration – The ability to work effectively with other supply chain 
entities for mutual benefit, e.g. sharing information and other resources necessary for 
response and recovery. 
Rice & Caniato (2003); Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009); Pettit et 
al. (2010); Jüttner & Maklan (2011); Ponis & Koronis (2012); 
Leat & Revoredo (2013); Brandon-Jones et al. (2014); Scholten 
et al. (2014); Gong et al.( 2015); Scholten &Schilder  (2015) 
Use of information technology – Information technology enhances connectivity and 
supports other resilience strategies, e.g. visibility and collaboration, which can help in 
coordinating responses to disruptions.  





Table II: Taxonomy of Endogenous and Exogenous Threats to the Supply Chain, SCRES Strategies & Outcomes 
 
  Examples 
Supply Chain Threats 
Endogenous 
Supply-side 
Long distance sourcing triggered threats, limited local supply market, product counterfeiting*, poor quality raw 
materials, dishonest suppliers, raw material delays and shortages, financial difficulties of suppliers, supplier 
delivery failure, reputational risk 
Firm-level 
Machine breakdowns, owner management behaviour, dishonest employees*, insufficient skilled manpower, poor 
internal coordination, poor quality products, payment threat (to suppliers/labour), Financial difficulties (focal firm), 
procurement risk, poor customer delivery performance 
Demand-side 
Power asymmetries related threats (stronger customers), dishonest customers/ distributors*, Payment threat (from 




Political instabilities*, geographical location (landlockedness), national politics, government policy,  weak legal 
system,  corruption*,   product counterfeiting,  in-transit raw material theft,  communication barriers,  natural 
disasters 
Economic 
Informal sector,  unfair competition*,  poor transport infrastructure, unstable taxation, exchange rate fluctuations,  
power shortages 
SCRES strategies 
Operations & supply chain 
focussed 
Supply management 
Backward integration, outsourcing, appropriate supplier selection, alternative transportation, multiple sourcing, 
supplier development, maintaining strategic stocks, buying instead of making (temporarily),  effective contracting, 
local sourcing, order splitting, enhancing proximity to suppliers, procurement management,  quality management, 
exclusive sourcing, inter-branch stock transfer 
Demand management Creating customer flexibility, customer incentives, inventory management, product recalls, demand forecasting 




Product management Manufacturing flexibility, ensuring product security 




Co-opetition, collaboration with government, collaboration with customers, collaboration with suppliers, Informal 
networking 
Information management 
Risk communication, market intelligence, increasing product knowledge, improving visibility, using information 
communication technology 
Outcomes  
Operations & supply chain 
focussed strategy outcomes 
To the supply-side  Poor quality raw materials, limited flexibility to switch suppliers, raw material delays and shortages 
To firm operations Financial difficulties (focal firm), stock theft, loss of control, labour turn-over, confidentiality risk 
To demand-side  Distributor complacency, reduced customer base, poor customer delivery performance 
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To entire supply chain Product counterfeiting, reputational risk 
Relational & integration 
focussed strategy outcomes 
To supply-side Limited flexibility to switch suppliers, supplier complacency, raw material delays and shortages 
To firm operations Confidentiality risk 








Table III: Sample Categories of Threats with Evidence from the Interviews 
(Note: categories relate to asterisks in Table II) 
 
Category Example Quotations 
Product counterfeiting 
“Counterfeiting is becoming a disaster in our supply chain…sometimes our 
raw materials are mixed with stones. In the last few months, we found 
people with a large inventory of sand mixed with cement in our packaging.” 
(Procurement Manager for EU) 
Dishonest employees 
“…Late payment to workers ... They…destroy machines, destabilize the 
processes and produce poor quality beer intentionally. Sometimes we are 
unable to supply or we supply spoilt beer. Machine breakdowns are caused 
by... workers …But it becomes hard when the breakdown is due to 
employees’ intentional actions.” (Procurement Manager for JU) 
Dishonest customers/ 
distributors 
“…Dishonest customers…after entrusting the distributor with goods worth 
millions, they disappear, refuse to pay or switch to competitors.  But we 
forward to the legal department to handle such cases. But sometimes these 
cases vanish due to corruption [bribery].” (Assistant Sales Manager for LU) 
Political instabilities 
“When there was political violence in Kenya, all manufacturing companies 
in Uganda ran out of stock of raw materials…Our raw materials could not 
be delivered via Mombasa. By the nature of our location in Uganda, 
whenever there are elections in Kenya, we expect violence … because we 
are a landlocked country.” (Procurement Manager for PU) 
Corruption 
 “We are in touch with the government and Uganda Revenue Authority to 
handle counterfeiters. But they [counterfeiters] may be part of the 
investigators. They get a lot of profit and can bribe Uganda Revenue 
Authority and government staff.”(Export Manager for BU) 
Unfair competition 
 “Our competitors set aside a lot of money and bought our empties [bottles] 
so that we fail to produce due to a lack of packaging materials. Even our 
employees or customers would sell our empties to the competitors. .. There 
have been times when we have a shortage of empty crates - the competitors 
buy and keep them so that we cannot produce. We could not fulfil our 

















Table IV: Nodes in the Network of Conditions, Threats, Strategies and Outcomes Ranked According 





Links out of 
the Node 
Total No. of 
Links 
1 Raw material delays and shortages 25 29 54 
2 Financial difficulties (focal firm) 18 12 30 
3 Poor customer delivery performance 21 6 27 
4 Poor quality products 8 13 21 
5 Reduced customer base 20 1 21 
6 Poor quality raw materials 10 10 20 
7 Product counterfeiting 7 13 20 
8 Payment threat (to suppliers/labour) 5 14 19 
9 Machine breakdowns 6 12 18 
10 Demand variations 4 13 17 
11 Unfair competition 5 12 17 
12 Collaboration with suppliers 8 7 15 
13 Government policy 0 13 13 
14 Risk communication 13 0 13 
15 Dishonest employees 1 11 12 
16 Supplier delivery failures 3 9 12 
17 Corruption 0 11 11 
18 Dishonest customers/distributors 1 10 11 
19 Dishonest suppliers 0 11 11 
20 Limited local supply market 0 11 11 
21 Order cancellations 7 4 11 
22 Reputational risk 8 3 11 
 
38 Power shortages 0 8 8 
46 Insufficient skilled manpower 0 6 6 
58 Natural disasters 0 5 5 
82 Geographical location (landlockedness) 0 2 2 





Table V: Aspects of Embeddedness Revealed in the Data: Political, Cultural and Territorial Embeddedness 
 
Category Components & Sample Evidence from the Data Examples of Associated Threats 
Political 
Embeddedness 
Political Instabilities e.g. within Uganda and the neighbouring countries like Kenya Raw material delays and shortages 
National Politics e.g. political networks and patronages perpetrating corruption  Unfair competition 
Government Policy e.g. on counterfeits where the government standards body (Uganda National Bureau of Standards) 
recommends the use of counterfeits rather than fight them 
Product counterfeiting 





Corruption e.g. bribery, conflict of interest, connivance, political favouritism and lack of transparency Poor transport infrastructure 
Informal Sector e.g. managers in some industries are not willing to formerly register their businesses mainly to avoid 
taxes. About 80% of actors in the dairy industry are unregistered  
Reduced customer base and 
financial difficulties 
Unfair Competition e.g. firms use connivance to sabotage their competitors’ supply chain operations. For example, 
they collude with suppliers so as not to deliver raw materials to their competitors or at least to deliver late 
Raw material delays and shortages 
Product Counterfeiting e.g. compounded by a culture where government employees responsible for fighting 
counterfeiting are themselves counterfeiters and local suppliers who deliver counterfeit raw materials 
Reputational risk 
Dishonest Suppliers e.g. some local suppliers are dishonest and unreliable. They are deceptive about  their capacity 
and they accept orders that they fail to deliver 
Supplier delivery failure 
Dishonest Customers/Distributors e.g. some customers connive with company employees and either manipulate the 
prices and share the difference or load more quantity into lorries/containers than bought 
Financial difficulties 
Negative Perceptions of Overseas Suppliers e.g. some overseas suppliers have a negative perception of firms from 
African countries (e.g. corrupt, likely to collapse) leading to denying them trade credit 
Reputational risk and raw material 
delays and shortages 
Dishonest Employees e.g. employees steal company money, deceive customers, deliberately produce poor quality 
products and cause machine breakdowns, sometimes as a retaliation against low and delayed salaries 
Poor customer delivery 
performance 
Owner/Management Behaviour e.g. owner managers have a culture of intervening in professional activities, such as 
procurement, making duplicate purchases or purchasing poor quality items 
Procurement risk  
Customer Characteristics  e.g. many Ugandan customers are willing to buy counterfeit products knowingly (as long as 
they are cheaper) 




Geographical Location/Landlockedness e.g. Political chaos in Kenya disrupts the flow of raw materials Raw material delays and shortages 
Spatial Proximity e.g. overseas sourcing of most raw materials and long distances from the suppliers Communication barriers 
 
